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1I. Introduction
A country’s pension system serves as a basic component of its social safety net.  The
importance of the pension system is more pronounced in Korea than in many other
countries due to its fast aging population and increasing costs to support the elderly.
The old-age dependency ratio1, which currently stands at 10.0 percent, is expected to
rise rapidly to 18.9 percent in 2020, and 29.8 percent in 2030 (National Statistical
Office).  Moreover, the traditional system of old-age support within families is on the
decline; and this trend will become more amplified over the next few years.  Hence,
strengthening public pension schemes and promoting the private pension market is one
of the most urgent policy issues that Korea currently faces.
Unfortunately, however, the future of Korean public pension schemes is not bright.  All
four pension schemes – the national pension, government employees pension, military
personnel pension, and private school teachers pension – are likely to face financial
troubles in the near future.  Korean public pension schemes strongly favor early
contributors to the point that their benefits are much higher than their actual
contributions.  This imbalance between low contributions and high benefits makes the
whole system financially weak and vulnerable.  The military personnel pension has
already been in deficit for several decades and the government employees pension is
about to follow suit.  The imbalance is also aggravating inter-generational equity, as the
government has no choice but to either lower the benefit levels of late contributors or
raise their insurance premiums to restore financial stability to the system.
The problem is not limited to Korea.  Many developed countries have already
experienced similar problems because of population aging or slow economic growth.
Nonetheless, we can find some successful pension reforms, which overcame political
resistance to cut pension benefits or to raise the pensionable age.  More recently, some
Latin American countries including Chile have privatized their public pensions and
many advanced countries are also considering privatization.  The World Bank advertises
privatization as an unavoidable choice in the 21st century (World Bank, 1994).  The
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 Ratio of persons aged 65 and over to persons aged 15-64.
2privatization, however, is not a panacea.  Although, it may solve the financial problem,
it can also bring about some undesirable side effects.  Administrative costs may increase
due to excessive competition between private insurers to attract customers (Munnell,
1999).  Low-income earners may be left out with little or no pensions due to their
insufficient contributions.  We should therefore take into full consideration our social
circumstances as well as the merits and demerits of each strategy in pursuing pension
reform.
For many years, experts in academia have pointed out the structural weakness and
financial instability of public pension schemes and the inefficiency in fund
management, and pressed for a fundamental reform of the system.  But the discussion
often became entangled in political disputes among interested parties and the reform did
not materialize.  If not properly dealt with now, however, the instability is sure to result
in greater economic and social burden.
In this context, this paper has two main objectives.  First, it describes the current
situation of Korea’s old-age income security system along with its problems.  Second, it
presents proposals to improve the income security system in preparation for the 21st
century.  We argue that the reform measures should be compatible with ever-changing
economic and social circumstances as well as being financially sustainable.  In addition,
excessive reliance on public pension schemes should be avoided and a multi-pillar
pension system that incorporates the complementary roles of three parties, namely, the
state, private corporations, and individuals, should be set up.
3II. Current State and Problems of the Old-Age Income Security System
1. Public Pension Schemes
A. Current State
 
1) National Pension Scheme
The National Pension Scheme (NPS), covering workers in establishments with 10 or
more employees, was implemented in 1988.  In 1992, the compulsory coverage was
expanded to those firms with 5 or more employees.  It was expanded further in 1995 to
farmers, fishermen, and the self-employed who reside in rural areas and, finally in April
1999, to the self-employed in urban areas.  This rapid expansion of coverage resulted in
a sharp – about quadruple – increase in the number of participants from 4,433,000 in
1988 to 16,230,000 in February 2000.  However, 5,320,000 persons, approximately one
third of the total participants, are exempt from mandatory contribution for various
reasons.  It would therefore be fair to say that the era of ‘national’ pension has yet to
arrive.
Table 1 shows the financial state of the NPS up to 2000.  The reserve has been rapidly
increasing as coverage expanded and as the contribution rate rose from 3 percent to 9
percent of the payroll.  The small number of pension beneficiaries also limited the
growth in expenditures.  The NPS reserve in 1999 amounted to 45 trillion won, about
9.6 percent of GDP.  A tentative figure for 2000 is 55 trillion won.2  This increase in the
reserve, however, does not guarantee the financial stability of the NPS in the long run.
Rather, it merely reflects its early stage of development.
                                                          
2
 Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2000 National Pension Fund Management Plan (Draft), Sept. 1999.
4Table 1. Financial Trends of the National Pension Scheme
(in billion won)
Revenues Expenditures
Year
Total Contributions Others1) Total Benefits Admin.Costs
Accumulated
Reserves
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000p
528.2
712.0
1,019.3
1,279.5
1,662.8
3,222.7
4,341.5
5,393.5
6,868.7
8,162.2
12,119.9
12,189.9
13,298.7
506.9
627.9
834.0
984.8
1,223.4
2,639.4
3,325.7
3,966.3
4,943.6
5,675.7
7,840.7
8,328.2
9,105.8
21.3
84.1
185.3
294.7
439.4
583.4
1,015.7
1,427.2
1,925.2
2,486.5
4,279.2
3,861.7
4,192.9
0.3
6.7
53.8
150.7
240.0
361.3
597.6
793.9
1,153.2
1,932.4
2,486.4
4,525.9
3,465.0
0.3
5.7
42.6
110.9
216.5
333.1
519.1
755.5
1,117.6
1,499.8
2,425.5
4,424.6
3,354.7
0
0.9
11.2
39.8
23.5
28.2
78.5
38.4
35.5
432.5
60.9
101.3
110.3
527.9
1,233.3
2,198.7
3,327.5
4,750.3
7,611.8
11,355.7
15,955.4
21,670.9
27,900.7
37,534.3
45,198.3
55,032.0
Note: 1) Returns on investments and other miscellaneous income.
Source: National Pension Corporation, National Pension Statistical Yearbook, various issues.
A correct assessment of the long-run financial stability should be based on the
difference between the amount of reserves necessary for all future pension payments
and the actual balance held by the Pension Corporation, in other words, the volume of
net implicit pension debt.  The net implicit pension debt was estimated to exceed 120
trillion won as of the end of 1998.3
The financial vulnerability of the NPS stems from its structural imbalance.  The initial
benefit level was initially set at 70 percent of the lifetime average income for persons
with 40 years of contribution.  This high level of benefit requires contribution rates of
22-24 percent, which are far above the current level of 9 percent.  If this imbalance
between contributions and benefits remains intact, the annual benefit payments will
exceed the annual contributions by the year 2020 and the fund is likely to be exhausted
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 The estimated volume of net implicit pension debt ranges from 127 trillion won by Kim, Y. H. (1999) to
30 percent of GDP by the World Bank (1999, p.25).
5around 2031 (National Pension Reform Board, 1997).  To remedy this structural
problem, the National Pension Reform Board was formed in 1997.  Its members
included government officials and private representatives.  Partly following their advice,
the government amended the National Pension Act in 1998.  The average income
replacement rate was reduced from 70 percent to 60 percent and the minimum
pensionable age was set to increase gradually from 60 to 65.  The contribution rate
(currently 9 percent) will be adjusted every five years from 2010 on to narrow the gap
between contributions and payments.
This parametric reform is expected to help restore the financial sustainability of the NPS
in the long run.  The National Pension Reform Board estimated that the ratio of the
reserves to the annual expenditure would be 9.9 in 2040, 8.8 in 2050 and 8.7 in 2080
(Table 2).  But these estimates are based on the assumption that the future contribution
rate will be gradually raised upward to reach 19.1 percent in 2025.  If the current
contribution rate of 9 percent is sustained, the fund is expected to be exhausted by 2040.
Raising the contribution rate by more than twice the current level is sure to face
resistance from contributors.  It may also yield negative effects on employment and
productivity growth.  Thus, it seems necessary to reconsider the option of reducing the
benefit level further as proposed by the National Pension Reform Board.
Table 2. Financial Prospects of the National Pension Scheme
(in trillion won, at 1995 constant prices)
Year Reserves Revenues Expenditures Reserve ratio
1)
(-fold)
Dependency
ratio2) (%)
1998
2000
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
2060
2070
2080
   38.5
   66.8
  295.6
  758.5
1,439.9
1,974.2
2,332.9
2,810.4
3,419.2
4,204.0
 11.9
 16.7
 46.6
106.2
179.4
240.6
298.8
371.1
458.5
574.0
  0.7
  1.4.
 11.3
 42.2
111.3
199.0
265.2
316.0
391.1
483.1
54.0
44.8
26.1
17.9
12.9
 9.9
 8.8
 8.9
 8.7
 8.7
 1.7
 3.0
13.4
23.8
35.4
43.6
44.1
10.8
41.3
41.1
6Note: This table assumes that the average income replacement rate is maintained at 60% and that the
contribution rate will be adjusted to keep the NPS in balance (contribution rates: 11.55% in 2010,
14.10% in 2015, 16.60% in 2020, and 19.10% in 2025).
1) Reserve ratio: the ratio of reserves to total expenditures.
2) Dependency ratio: the ratio of the number of pensioners to that of contributors.
Source: National Pension Reform Board (1997).
2) Government Employees Pension Scheme
The Government Employees Pension Scheme (GEPS), the oldest public pension scheme
in Korea, was introduced in 1960.  The number of participants increased from 237,000
at the time of introduction to 982,000 in 1997.  The number is now decreasing (down to
952,000 in 1998) due to the increased layoffs and early retirements prompted by the
recent government restructuring.  This downward trend is expected to last until the year
2002.  Meanwhile, the number of pensioners as a percentage of contributors rose from
0.3 percent in 1980 to 9.4 percent in 1998.
The GEPS has been modified several times during the last 40 years.  The initial
contribution rate was 4.6 percent, shared equally by the employer (the state) and the
employees, and it now stands at 15 percent.  The minimum pensionable age was initially
set to 60 in 1960 and then abolished in 1962, entitling all retirees to immediate pension
benefits regardless of their age.  An additional retirement allowance plan was
introduced in 1991.  The scheme is similar to the severance payment plans provided in
the private sector and has been partially (up to 1995), and then fully (since 1996),
funded by the government.
An early sign of financial instability of the GEPS surfaced in 1995 when it ran into
deficit for the first time in its history.  The problem was further aggravated in 1998
when a large number of new retirees (approximately 20,000 more than the average in
previous years) sharply increased the benefit payments.  The deficit amounted to 1.4
trillion won in 1998 and is estimated to have increased to 2.8 trillion won in 1999.
7Table 3. Financial Trends of the Government Employees Pension Scheme
(in billion won)
Revenues Expenditures
Contributions byYear
Total
Gov’t Employees
Gov’t
Subsidies
1)
Others2) Total Benefits Admin.
costs
Accum.
Reserves
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
807.2
916.3
1,131.9
1,386.7
1,653.7
1,989.9
2,276.2
2,545.4
2,963.1
3,328.7
3,652.7
262.0
306.4
379.5
464.9
536.4
654.1
702.6
758.2
951.5
1,030.9
1,009.0
275.2
322.9
407.5
485.1
574.4
655.9
721.2
755.6
950.8
1,012.6
965.4
0
0
0
14.2
121.3
246.8
307.2
459.9
535.8
641.0
1,297.3
5.8
8.2
10.3
20.7
13.6
18.2
21.0
25.1
37.8
47.7
44.6
443.3
515.3
701.3
891.9
1,179.2
1,579.4
1,895.7
2,594.2
2,409.1
2,787.0
5,048.7
442.9
512.6
695.9
885.1
1,171.4
1,571.4
1,886.3
2,584.1
2,397.6
2,774.2
5,011.9
0.4
2.7
5.4
6.8
7.8
8.0
9.4
10.1
11.5
12.8
36.8
380.3
1,783.0
3,578.6
4,043.6
4,491.8
4,900.3
5,241.4
5,149.5
5,680.5
6,201.5
4,784.4
Note: 1) Transfers from the government budget to finance the retirement allowance plan.
   2) Returns on investments and other miscellaneous income.
Source: Government Employees Pension Corporation, Government Employees Pension Statistical
Yearbook, various issues.
The government raised the contribution rate to 13 percent in 1996 and then to 15
percent in 1999.  But these measures are far from sufficient to avoid the crisis.  The total
exhaustion of the fund is foreseen in around 2001 (Moon et al., 1999) and the deficit is
likely to skyrocket to 1.8 trillion won in 2005, 6 trillion in 2010, and 31 trillion in 2020
(see Table 4).  In fact, due to lack of liquid assets, the GEPS failed to meet its payment
obligation in 2000 and had to borrow 1 trillion won from the government.  A bigger sum
of government support looks inevitable this year.
8Table 4. Financial Prospects of the Government Employees Pension Scheme
(in billion won)
Revenues
Year TotalExpenditure Total Contributions
Balance Reserves
2000
2001
2002
2003
2005
2010
2015
2020
2030
2040
2050
  3,211
  3,895
  4,471
  4,014
  5,256
 11,179
 21,468
 40,915
111,356
193,458
315,214
 2,328
 2,440
 2,591
 2,809
 3,410
 5,229
 7,295
 9,748
16,130
33,274
58,570
 2,281
 2,440
 2,591
 2,809
 3,410
 5,229
 7,295
 9,748
16,130
33,274
58,570
   -883
  -1,455
  -1,879
  -1,204
  -1,846
  -5,950
 -14,174
 -31,167
 -95,227
-160,184
-256,644
 554
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
Source: Moon et al. (1999).
In sum, the GEPS is facing serious financial instability.  A short-term factor may be the
rapid increase in expenditures due to the recent public sector restructuring.  However,
the fundamental reason lies in its structural imbalance.  The replacement rate of the
GEPS is 70 percent of the final monthly wage of the retiree with 30 years of
participation.  The benefit level is very high compared to the civil servants pension
schemes in other countries including the US (CSRS, 56 percent), France (60 percent),
and Germany (56 percent).  For the last 40 years, the Korean government has been keen
to increasing benefits while maintaining the contribution rate at low levels.  For
example, the minimum pensionable age was set at 60 in 1960, and then abolished
shortly after.  The abolition is regarded as one of the major causes of the financial
instability of the scheme.  The government has also continuously expanded the salary
base on which the benefits are calculated.  The result is unsustainably high benefits and
low contributions.
3) Private School Teachers Pension Scheme
9The Private School Teachers Pension Scheme (PSTPS) was introduced in 1973 and
implemented in 1975, that is, 15 years later than the GEPS.  The two schemes are very
similar in structure in that both share the same kind of financial problems.  The number
of pensioners increased from 13 in 1982, seven years after its introduction, to 20,084 in
1999, with an average annual growth rate of 34.6 percent.  This increase reflects a rapid
aging of the participants.  The number of participants in PSTPS increased from 40,347
in 1975 to 207,664 in 1999, with an average annual growth rate of 8 percent.  In 1982,
only 0.1 percent of the participants had been in the scheme for more than 20 years.  But
by 1999, their share increased to 17.4 percent.  Upon retirement, these pensioners are
sure to impose a heavy burden on the finances of the scheme.
So far, the PSTPS has been in surplus as shown in Table 5.  Its accumulated reserves
amounted to 3.8 trillion won at the end of 1999, which corresponds to about 5.6 times
the total expenditure in that year.  It is noteworthy, however, that its revenue for the
period of 1975-99 grew by 27 percent per annum while its expenditure grew at a much
faster rate of 49 percent.  If the expenditure continues to increase at this rate, a financial
crisis is inevitable.  Furthermore, the pension payments as a percentage of contributions
increased from 2 percent in 1975 to 49 percent in 1985, and eventually surpassed 100
percent in 1999.  Given no structural change, the scheme will suffer a deficit from mid-
2020s and its future will be similar to that of the GEPS.  Kim Hyun-Kook (1999)
estimates that under the current trend, the fund will be completely exhausted by 2016
(see Table 6).
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Table 5. Financial Trends of the Private School Teachers Pension Scheme
(in billion won)
Revenues Expenditures
Contributions byYear
Total
Employees Employers Gov’t
Gov’t
Subsidies Others
1) Total Benefits Admin.
costs
Accum.
Reserves
1975
1980
1985
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
4.6
42.4
139.7
302.3
343.4
469.0
546.5
635.2
594.9
772.4
889.1
995.7
1,068.3
2.2
13.4
48.9
95.0
110.4
129.5
148.8
162.3
172.0
218.3
244.1
241.5
1.4
9.5
23.6
54.7
65.6
77.9
89.2
99.0
106.5
136.2
151.9
151.4
0.8
3.8
8.9
20.3
24.0
28.4
32.4
35.7
38.2
51.8
56.7
57.1
72.8
0.1
0.4
0.6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.1
15.1
57.7
132.4
143.4
233.3
276.0
338.2
278.2
365.9
436.4
545.6
682.4
0.2
6.8
44.2
112.6
130.4
181.3
209.8
322.1
321.2
341.2
396.7
552.2
682.4
0.1
6.4
39.9
109.5
127.3
176.6
205.0
316.7
316.3
335.6
390.0
545.9
0.1
0.4
3.5
3.1
3.1
4.7
4.8
5.4
4.9
5.6
6.7
6.3
4.5
98.2
448.2
1,163.6
1,364.1
1,614.2
1,907.5
2,170.1
2,390.5
2,758.6
3,190.4
3,442.8
3,828.7
Note: 1) Returns on investments and other miscellaneous income.
Source: Private School Teachers Pension Corporation, Private School Teachers Pension Statistical
Yearbook, various issues.
Table 6. Financial Prospects of the Private School Teachers Pension Scheme
(number of persons, in billion won)
Revenues Expenditures
Year Retirees
Total Contributions Total Benefits
Accum.
Reserves
2000
2003
2010
2015
2016
2020
2030
2040
14,872
14,928
18,024
20,642
21,029
22,337
23,672
29,669
880
1,175
2,020
2,324
2,352
3,176
6,518
13,336
559
756
1,479
2,181
2,352
3,176
6,518
13,336
677
794
2,097
4,010
4,495
6,845
14,320
33,530
650
759
2,053
3,966
4,451
6,801
14,276
33,486
3,678
4,789
6,183
1,604
-539
-12,576
-74,626
-216,474
Source: Kim H.K., Current Status of the Private School Teachers Pension Scheme, mimeo, 1999.
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4) Military Personnel Pension Scheme
The Military Personnel Pension Scheme (MPPS) started in 1960 as part of the GEPS,
then was separated from the latter in 1963.  Currently, approximately 150,000 officers
are participating in the scheme.  The MPPS has a similar structure to that of the GEPS,
but there is a notable difference in the participants’ average years of service.  Whereas
the retirement age of civil servants ranges between 55 and 63, most of the military
personnel retire much earlier, with shorter periods of contributions and longer periods of
benefits.  In addition, those who participated in war (e.g. Vietnam War) are credited
with two extra years for each year in combat when their contribution periods are
calculated.
Due to this feature, payments under the MPPS began in 1961, the same year as the
introduction of the scheme.  The number of pensioners increased from 5,057 in 1961 to
14,000 in 1975, 25,000 in 1980, 31,000 in 1985, and around 40,000 in 1991.  This
continuous increase served as a major factor of the scheme’s financial instability.
Table 7. Financial Trends of the Military Personnel Pension Scheme
(in billion won)
Revenues Expenditures
Contributions byYear
Total
Gov’t Employees
Gov’t
Subsidies Others
1) Total Benefits Admin.
costs
Accum.
Reserves
1962
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1994
1998
1999
0.6
0.8
4.9
13.3
76.1
185.5
406.4
825.7
942.1
1,013.0
0.4
0.4
2.8
3.6
11.9
27.5
59.1
95.1
130.6
158.6
0.2
0.2
1.9
3.8
14.1
31.9
59.6
95.1
130.6
158.6
0
0
0
5.3
41.7
121.4
271.5
596.9
537.1
565.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.6
8.4
4.7
16.2
38.5
143.8
0.5
0.6
3.5
9.4
66.0
171.1
388.6
764.7
769.2
1,003.0
0.5
0.5
3.5
9.4
66.0
171.1
388.5
764.6
769.1
1,002.9
0
0
0
0
0.1
0
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.3
1.7
3.8
41.7
100.7
177.6
304.7
414.4
-
Note: 1) Returns on investments and other miscellaneous income.
Source: Ministry of Defense.
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In fact, the MPPS has received direct government support since the mid-1970s to make
both ends meet as seen in Table 7.  The government support amounted to 565.1 billion
won in 1999 and is imposing a large burden on the government budget.  In 1995, the
support accounted for 1.3 percent of the general account expenditure and 5.7 percent of
the total defense budget.  The annual expenditure exceeded the annual contribution
revenue in 1972, and the ratio of the former to the latter increased to 253 percent in
1980, 289 percent in 1985, and 316 percent in 1999.  The situation will only worsen in
the future unless a radical restructuring of the MPPS is pursued.
B. Problems
1) Structural Imbalance and Financial Vulnerability
As previously discussed, the most serious problem of the public pension schemes lies in
the long-term financial instability emanating from the structural imbalance between
benefits and contributions.  The problem is particularly serious in public occupational
pensions – the military personnel pension, government employees pension, and private
school teachers pension.  The National Pension Scheme will suffer less from financial
instability, and may yield fewer deficits per participant.  But the deficit of the NPS
cannot be ignored because of its much larger size than that of all occupational pension
schemes combined.
The NPS and public occupational pension schemes have different benefit formulas
(Table 8).  The pension benefit formula of the NPS consists of two parts, the basic part
and the earnings-related part.  The first part is not related to the individual earnings
history and the same amount is paid to all beneficiaries, allowing income redistribution
among them.  Other public occupational pension schemes provide strictly earnings-
related benefits.
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Table 8. Korea’s Public Pension Schemes
National Pension Scheme Occupational Pension Schemes
Unit
Individual
(Household for self-employed)
Individual
Contribution
rate
Employer: 4.5%
Employee: 4.5%
Self-employed: 3% (1999) → 9% (2008)
Gov’t /Employer: 7.5%
Employee: 7.5%Premium
Contribution
base Ceilings on the base No ceilings on the base
Benefit Entitlements
• Old-age pension: at least 10 years of
contribution
• Disability pension    more than
• Survivor pension     1 year of
                     contribution
• Retirement pension: 20-33 years
of contribution
• Lump-sum payment for disability
and early death
Formula
0.3 ( w  + W) (n/40)
• Partially earnings-related and has an
income redistribution component
(0.5 +0.02n) W*
• Strictly earnings-related
Base
wage
W: Lifetime average wage of the
beneficiary
w : Average wage of the whole
contributors in the previous year
W*: Final wage of the beneficiary
Indexation Consumer Price Index (CPI) Wage
Minimum
pensionable
age
60 years (to be raised to 65) Upon retirement
Payment
type Pension only
The beneficiary can choose between
pension and lump sum payment.
Old-Age
(Retirement)
Pension
Benefits
Survivor
benefits 60% of the basic pension 70% of the basic pension
The average benefit levels are also different between the NPS and occupational
pensions.  For example, suppose that two persons with the same 20 years of contribution
have participated in different schemes.  The person under the NPS will be entitled to a
pension corresponding to 30 percent of his/her lifetime average monthly income,
whereas the other person under an occupational pension will be paid 50 percent of
his/her final pre-retirement monthly income.  In addition, the payment will begin right
after the retirement for the latter regardless of his/her age, whereas the former should
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wait until he/she reaches the minimum pensionable age.  Other differences between the
NPS and occupational pensions lie in areas such as payment indexation and survivors’
pension.
Overall, the benefit levels are higher in occupational pensions.  This raises the
uncomfortable issue of whether the general taxpayer (including low-income workers),
should pay for the benefits of occupational pensioners even though the latter group, as a
whole, enjoys higher wages.  This inequity is certainly not a desirable feature of any
social insurance system.  To make occupational pensions financially sustainable and
their benefit levels compatible with the NPS, a fundamental overhaul of their
benefit/contribution structure is needed.
The NPS is also in need of repair.  Its financial stability is not yet guaranteed despite the
amendment of the National Pension Act in 1998.  Hence, more drastic measures are
needed to reduce the benefit level.  The National Pension Reform Board recommended
that the government lower the replacement rate from 70 percent to 40 percent with a 40-
year contribution and a fixed contribution rate of 12 percent.  The recommendation,
however, was not accepted by the government.
2) Hasty Coverage Expansion
As explained earlier, the NPS expanded its coverage in 1999 to include workers in
urban areas.  This sudden expansion, with insufficient preparation, left many poor, self-
employed and low-income workers outside the pension system.  In addition, the
horizontal equity between employees and the self-employed was not properly assured
due to the technical difficulty in assessing the latter group’s correct income level.
Incorrect assessment distorts the income redistribution among participants in the NPS.
For the period of February-April 1999, the average monthly income of 4,025 self-
employed persons in urban areas as reported to the authorities was 842,000 won, which
was less than 60 percent of the average income of employees (1,420,000 won).  It is
clear that most of the self-employed did not declare their incomes honestly.  The amount
of pension benefits for incumbent pensioners declined because part of it depends on the
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average income of all participants.4  Consequently, many pensioners expressed their
discontent.
The Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) has since increased efforts for correct
income assessment.  As a result, the average reported income of the self-employed in
urban areas gradually increased from 842,000 to 956,000 won by the end of 1999.  But
their income still remains less than 70 percent of the average income of employees
(Table 9).  It is also far below the benchmark level suggested by MOHW (Kim, Jin-Soo,
1999).
Table 9. Average Income of Participants in the NPS by Type (1999)
(in thousand won, thousand persons)
Other Participants
Total Employees1) Rural
Areas
Urban
Areas2) Type Type Type Type Type
Number
of
Persons
10,536 5,226 1,395 3,914 615 831 1,225 606 637
Average
Income 1,130 1,386 659 956 1,406 988 838 917 747
Note: 1) Employees in workplaces with 5 or more employees.
 2) : High-income self-employed : Middle-income self-employed : Poor self-employed :
Employees in workplaces with 4 or less employees : Temporary and daily workers
Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare.
The situation is unlikely to improve within a short period of time because of the
deficiency in income assessment mechanisms.  The incentives for the self-employed to
underreport their income may even increase when the contribution rate rises gradually
from 3 percent to 9 percent of earnings.  Sharing information with the National Tax
Service will be of some help, but the latter’s income assessment tools are limited as
well.  In addition, the increase in irregular employment due to the enhanced flexibility
                                                          
4
 The decline in the average income of all participants in 1999 (11.1%) was due to the decline in real
income due to the economic crisis (4.0%) as well as the adverse effect of the expansion of coverage to
those in urban areas (7.1%).  The Ministry of Health and Welfare responded by raising w  (Table 8) in
1999 (1,130,250 won) to the level in 1998 (1,271,595 won) (MOHW, 2000 National Pension Payment
Adjustment (Draft)).  However, this provisional response cannot solve the distortion in income
redistribution.
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of the labor market will also complicate the task.
Therefore, a structural reform with a long-term perspective is called for.  Some people
suggest that the self-employed be separated from the employees and that each pension
fund be managed independently.  But this cannot be a fundamental solution either.  The
problem lies in the regressive distribution between honest declarers and the dishonest
ones, not between the employees and the self-employed.
Furthermore, many low-income, self-employed persons and temporary and daily
workers are left out of the NPS.   As seen in Table 10, 4,638 thousand persons, or 54
percent of the 8,624 thousand participants in urban areas, are currently exempt from
compulsory contribution.  Among these, 3,468,000 are too poor to pay the insurance
premium.  Many of them will remain excluded from the system or their benefit level
will be considerably low due to their relatively short periods of contribution.  If this
issue is not properly dealt with in the near future, the social safety net under the NPS,
excluding those with the greatest need for old-age income security, would be
meaningless.
Table 10. Current State of Participation in the NPS
(as of February 2000)
(in thousand persons)
Participants
Persons exempt
from
contribution Not applicable 1) Unable to contribute 2)
Workplaces
Urban
Rural
5,308
8,624
2,081
-
4,638
682
-
1,170
171
-
3,468
511
Total 16,230 5,320 1,341 3,979
Note: 1) Those who are excluded from the scheme because they cannot pay the premium, including
students and those who joined the military service.
 2) Those who defer paying the premium for temporary reasons, including unemployment and
business failures.
Source: Lee, S.S., 2000.
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3) Inappropriate Levels of Contribution and Benefit
Despite the 1998 amendments, the income replacement rate remains at 60 percent for
those with 40-year contributions.5  This level is substantially high in comparison with
41 percent in the US, 40 percent in the UK, 50 percent in France, and 40 percent in
Canada. The severance payment, when added to the pension benefits, increases the total
replacement rate up to 80 percent.6  On the other hand, the appropriate post-retirement
income is estimated to be 55-70 percent of the pre-retirement income if the retiree is to
maintain comparable living standards (Schmitt, 1985).
Reducing the severance payments and converting part of them into pension benefits
would be a good way to lessen the duplication of two schemes and to lower the
replacement rate to an adequate level.  In fact, partial merging of two schemes was
planned when the NPS was introduced in 1988, but the plan was discarded unilaterally
by the government in the 1998 amendments without sufficient discussion.  Merging the
NPS with the severance payment system would also make it possible to restrain the
growth in labor costs.  The NPS contribution is regressive in nature because there are
ceilings on the contribution base.  It therefore has stronger effects on low-income
workers’ job opportunities.  In many OECD members with relatively inflexible labor
markets, the large social security costs are regarded as one of the major causes of the
high unemployment rate, in particular amongst low-income, unskilled workers (OECD,
1997).
This non-wage labor cost issue also is emerging as a major point of contention in Korea,
where various kinds of social insurance schemes have been recently introduced and
expanded.  The total contribution rate is approximately 15 percent and the part paid by
employers is over 7 percent, similar to the levels in other OECD members.  When the
cost of corporate severance payment schemes are taken into account (at around 8.3
percent of monthly wages), the employers’ burden exceeds 15 percent.  It will increase
                                                          
5
 The ratio is even higher for low-income workers at over 90%.
6
 If the mandated severance payments are converted into corporate pension schemes, the income
replacement rate reaches around 20 percent for those who have continuously worked at least 30 years
(Moon, 1999).
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further due to the imminent rise in medical insurance premiums and the more than
twofold growth of the NPS contribution rate that is expected over next 25 years.  The
increased labor cost is likely to serve as a disincentive for employers to hire workers,
resulting in a higher unemployment rate.
2. Retirement Allowance Scheme and Corporate Pension Scheme
A. Retirement Allowance Scheme
The severance payment system, or the mandatory retirement allowance scheme, is based
on Article 28 of the Labor Standards Act enacted in 1953.  It now covers all workplaces
with five or more employees.  Workers with more than one continuous year of service
are entitled to receive, upon retirement, a lump sum payment equivalent to one month of
the base salary for each year of service.  The base salary is calculated as an average of
salaries for three months before retirement.
The current retirement allowance scheme therefore favors relatively high-income
workers with a long history of service at one workplace.  The scheme does not provide
sufficient old-age income security for the majority of workers.  Retirement allowances
were often used by laid-off workers as living expenses during their job search periods,
at least until the unemployment insurance scheme was introduced in 1995.
Box 1. Retirement Allowance Schemes in Other Countries
- Japan: Retirement allowance schemes are in place in more than 90% of all workplaces, despite no
legal obligation.  Pensions (53%) are more popular than lump-sum payments (47%).
- The US, the UK, and Germany: Voluntary corporate pensions
- France: Mandatory corporate pensions
- Taiwan: Mandatory retirement allowances.  For those who continuously worked at least 15 years, the
average two monthly wages must be paid for each year of service up to the maximum of 45
monthly wages.
- Singapore: Mandatory retirement allowances.  For those who continuously worked at least 5 years,
the average monthly wage must be paid for each year of service.
19
Table 11. Current State of Retirement Allowance Beneficiaries
Year Workers coveredby the scheme1)
Ratio to the total
employees
Ratio to the
economically active
population
Ratio to the total
population
1966
1970
1975
1980
1985
1991
1993
1994
1995
452,951
945,675
1,448,099
2,841,317
3,583,457
5,118,915
5,380,284
5,695,912
6,192,130
5.4
9.7
12.2
20.7
23.9
27.5
27.9
28.7
30.3
5.0
9.3
11.7
19.7
23.0
26.8
27.1
28.0
29.7
1.5
2.9
4.1
7.5
8.8
11.8
12.1
12.7
13.7
Note: 1) Figures prior to 1975 include workplaces with 30 employees or more. Figures include
workplaces with 16 employees or more since 1975, and those with 10 employees or more after
1988.
Source: Ministry of Labor, Survey Report on Establishment Labor Conditions, various issues; Economic
Planning Board, Major Economic Indicators, various issues.
B. Corporate Pension Schemes
The amendment of the Labor Standards Act in March 1997 allowed employers to
convert their retirement allowance schemes into corporate pension schemes.  Insurance
companies started selling corporate pensions in April 1999.  The differences between
corporate pension and traditional retirement insurance are explained in Table 12.
Retirement allowance schemes currently cover only 30 percent of the total economically
active population, a much lower level than in the US (50 percent), Japan (39 percent),
and France (100 percent), and similar to that in the UK (29 percent).  Ninety-eight
percent of all workplaces with 30 or more employees have retirement allowance
schemes and 25 percent of them have a progressive structure.7  The low rates of
coverage indicate that it may be too early to discuss the universal introduction of
corporate pensions, which are much more costly to employers.
                                                          
7
 On average, when computing the retirement allowances, 5 years of service is credited with 6.1 instead of
5 months, 10 years with 13.3 months, 15 years with 21.6 months, 20 years with 30.3 months, 25 years
with 39.0 months, and 30 years with 47.7 months.
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Table 12. Retirement Insurance vs. Corporate Pension
Retirement Insurance Corporate Pension
Main
characteristics
- External reserve for retirement
allowances
- Managed by firms
- Legally allowed to substitute
retirement allowances
- Managed by individual workers
Payment entitled to - Employers upon agreement by
employees - Employees
Links to loans - Often used as collateral for loans tothe firm
- Legally protected from being used as
collateral or being transferred to other
persons
Management
agencies - Life insurance companies, banks
- Insurance companies, trust account in
banks, investment and trust companies
Eligible companies - Firms with 16 or more employees - Firms with 5 or more employees
Type - Fixed interest rate (7.5%) only - Fixed (6.0%) or indexed interest rate
Payment - Lump sum only - Lump sum or pension (insurance)
Account - General account - Special account (separated from GA)
Insurance premium
counted as - Corporate assets - Offsetting assets for liability
Legal base - Corporation Tax Act - Labor Standards Act
Although there have been continued efforts to promote the introduction of corporate
pensions in workplaces, the progress has been quite slow.  From the viewpoint of
workers, the relative merits of lump-sum retirement allowances and corporate pensions
depend on i) the security of benefits and ii) the level of benefits provided by each
scheme.  The security of benefits is at stake when employers do not respect the Labor
Standards Act or misuse the fund for other purposes.  But these problems can be solved
by guaranteeing retirement allowances for employees, even without introducing
corporate pensions.  For example, we may strengthen the wage guarantee system or
mandate an external management of the reserves.  On the other hand, the importance
given to the level of benefits will vary across individual workers.  For workers in small-
sized companies with short history, the security rather than the level of benefits will
bear greater importance, and vice versa for workers in large-scaled corporations with
longer history.  Across-the-board policy suggestions are therefore inadequate to promote
corporate pensions.
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For employers, the introduction of corporate pension schemes is likely to yield
additional burdens, as the reserves should now be managed externally.  Employers often
use the retirement insurance as collateral for loans and the in-house reserves as working
capital for business operation.  But these practices are not possible with corporate
pensions.  The merits of corporate pensions such as the favorable tax treatment given to
them and their role as a means of attracting and retaining high-skilled workers are rather
limited.  As a result, employers tend to show no great appetite for corporate pension
schemes.
The main reason why employees do not favor corporate pensions lies in the increased
uncertainty faced by them.  In a typical corporate pension program, employees have to
wait a long period (say 20 years) to receive pensions when they retire early (say at 40).
Given high uncertainties about the future, pension rights that accrue far into the future
serve as a disincentive for employees to choose corporate pensions.  The success of a
corporate pension program therefore crucially depends on the certainty with which the
benefit is guaranteed to the recipient.  In the US, various mechanisms are at work to
protect recipients from such uncertainties, including the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation.  Korea lacks these kinds of security measures, and unless various
institutional and legal underpinnings are set up to support corporate pensions, it will be
very difficult to expect the employees to welcome such a scheme.
3. Personal Pension Schemes
Since 1994, financial institutions have been selling various kinds of personal pension
plans.  Because of the large tax favors given to them, after-tax rates of return on
personal pensions are very high.  Even when a person drops his/her plan after five years
of contribution, he/she can get a higher return than on any other financial investment
with similar risk characteristics.  The market for personal pensions grew rapidly and
there has been fierce competition between various financial institutions for market
share.  In general, personal pension plans provided by banks give loan options to the
participants, while those provided by insurance companies have a combined
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characteristic of pension and insurance, and those provided by investment trust
corporations promise higher returns (of course with higher risks) than banks or
insurance companies.  For now, most of the plans can be terminated prematurely by
participants in the middle of the contribution period.  Many people do actually terminate
their plans prematurely because they regard personal pensions as a profitable financial
investment rather than as a means of securing their old-age income.  The excessive tax
favors and allowance for premature termination are fostering such an attitude.  Without
addressing these problems, we cannot expect personal pensions to fulfill their original
goal of providing a secure source of income to individuals after retirement.
III. Tasks for the Old-Age Income Security System Reform
1. Restructuring Public Pension Schemes
A. National Pension Scheme
The financial vulnerability of the NPS, the administrative difficulties in assessing the
incomes of the self-employed, and a large number of poor people left outside the system
requires a more radical and structural – rather than parametric – reform of the NPS.  To
address the issue, the government established the National Pension Reform Board,
consisting of more than thirty experts from both the public and private sectors, under the
Social Security Council in June 1996. After quite a few rounds of debates, they
proposed a comprehensive reform plan in June 1997.
According to the plan, the lump-sum part and the earnings-related part of the current
scheme will be separated from each other and a two-layered system consisting of the
basic pension (first layer) and the earnings-related pension (second layer) will be set up.
Every Korean national over 18 years of age will be covered by the basic pension plan,
leaving no one outside the National Pension Scheme.  The amount of the basic pension
benefit will be fixed across individuals regardless of one’s earnings history and it will
be just enough to cover the minimum cost of living.  Part of, or the entire revenue for
the basic pension, will come from general taxation, which will mitigate the problem of
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false income reports.
The earnings-related pension will be managed separately from the basic pension in a
fully funded system.  This characteristic will help secure the financial stability of the
scheme and will reduce the intergenerational transfer from the young to the old.  In
addition, it will allow those who have corporate pension plans with comparable benefit
levels to opt out from the earnings-related pension, thereby promoting the private
pension market.  Moreover, when reunification finally arrives on the Korean peninsula,
the basic pension plan may be quickly expanded to include North Koreans while the
earnings-related part is expanded gradually.
Box 2. Structural Reform Proposals by the National Pension Reform Board
(1997)
A. The Basic Structure of the New Scheme
 The existing scheme should be changed into a two-layered system consisting of a Basic Pension and
an Earnings-Related Pension.
- Basic Pension (BP): Every citizen aged between 18 and 60 should be covered by the BP and
provided with a defined benefit covering the minimum cost of living. The amount of benefit may
depend on the length of contribution. The participant unit may be either individuals or households.
- Earnings-Related Pension (ERP): Only the income-earners will be covered by the ERP. The ERP
contributions and benefits will be kept actuarially balanced at all times.
B. Income Redistribution in the New Scheme
 The Basic Pension as a definite benefit scheme will contribute to income redistribution.  The degree of
income redistribution in the current NPS is considered too high and should be reduced to an
appropriate level in the new scheme.
C. Revenue Sources
- BP: Part of or the entire premium should be generated from general taxation to overcome the
difficulties in income assessment. The current partial funding system should be maintained. The
government may set aside a fixed portion of the national tax revenue for the Scheme, or raise the
VAT rate and transfer the extra revenue to the Scheme.
- ERP: The current system of earnings-related proportional contribution should be maintained. ERP
should be fully funded and actuarially balanced. The management of ERP Fund shall be based on
the principle of profitability.
These recommendations by the National Pension Reform Board were not properly
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reflected in the amendment in 1998 due to the opposition by the Ministry of Health and
Welfare.  It is obvious, however, that the more pensioners there are, the greater will be
the resistance from vested interests and the less likely will be the reform to succeed.
Based on the recommendations of the Board, a reform at a relatively early stage of the
scheme is strongly called for.
B. Reform of Public Occupational Pension Schemes
For a radical restructuring of occupational pensions, the increase of contribution rates
and reduction of pension benefits is inevitable.  To reduce pension benefits, we can
resort to various methods, for example by introducing the minimum pensionable age,
strengthening the earnings test, or adjusting the benefit formula.
1) Raising Contribution Rates
Raising the contribution rates can help restore the financial health of occupational
pensions to a large degree.  However, unless accompanied by other measures, raising
the contribution rate cannot be a practical solution by itself because the contribution rate
would need to rise from the current level of 15 percent to more than 30 percent for civil
servants and private school teachers and to 50 percent for military personnel (Moon,
1995).  Thus we should focus on reducing benefit levels rather than raising the
contribution rates.
2) Introducing the Minimum Pensionable Age
Under the current system of no restriction on the pensionable age, the earlier a person
retires, the smaller he/she contributes to the scheme and the more he/she receives from
it as pension benefits.  For example, the average retirement age for military personnel is
45.  Their short contribution period along with their long benefit period of about 30
years is in fact a major cause of the financial instability of the scheme.  Most civil
servants also retire at a relatively young age of 55 and more than 80 percent of current
pensioners are under 60 years of age.  In order to reduce the inequity between early and
25
late retirees and to mitigate the financial pressure, the minimum pensionable age of the
occupational pensions should be gradually raised to 60 years, in line with that of the
NPS.
3) Strengthening the Means Test
All public pension schemes have a payment suspension system.  In this system, pension
benefits are reduced or put off when a retiree has a gainful job, for example by being re-
employed.   Its objective lies in reducing unnecessary financial burdens of pension
payments while satisfying the basic needs for old-age income security.  In current
occupational pensions, the pension payments are reduced by 50 percent for those
retirees who get re-employed in the public sector.  But if they are re-employed in the
private sector or become self-employed, the pension is fully paid.  This is not only
inequitable but it also hampers the financial sustainability of the scheme.  Therefore, it
is necessary to extend the payment suspension system to include those who are re-
employed in the private sector or those who are self-employed.
4) Adjusting Benefit Formulas
In occupational pensions, the amount of pension benefits depends on the final monthly
wage prior to one’s retirement and not on an average of lifetime wages as is the case in
the NPS.  So far as the final wage is larger than the lifetime average wage, this
arrangement increases the financial burden of occupational pensions.  In addition, the
marginal linkage between contributions and benefits is much weaker in this arrangement
since lifetime contributions are more accurately reflected in the average wage than in
the final wage.  Therefore, it is strongly recommended that the benefit formula of the
public occupational pension schemes be changed to use the lifetime average wage as the
base for benefits.
The method of indexation to protect the real value of pension benefits should be
changed as well.  While the NPS employs the consumer price index (CPI) for benefit
indexation, all occupational pension schemes rely on wage growth for indexation.  In
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the latter case, pension benefits are influenced more by the changes in labor market
conditions or in the wage system, and less by the changes in actual purchasing power.
For example, the rapid wage increase for government employees in the late 1980s
entailed a rapid increase in pension benefits for those who had already retired,
aggravating the financial instability of occupational pensions.  As the fundamental
objective of indexation lies in preserving the purchasing power of pension payments,
indexation should be based on CPI.  Such changes will also prevent pension benefits
from being adversely affected by, for example, wage moderation due to budget cuts.
5) Linkages among Public Pension Schemes
Government employees and schoolteachers can carry their pension rights when they
quit one occupational plan and enter another.  But there are no such linkages between
the NPS and occupational pensions.  For example, when a person moves from the public
sector to the private sector, he/she needs to terminate his/her occupational pension plan
and start a new NPS plan.  The lack of portability of pension rights puts those relatively
mobile workers at a disadvantage and discourages translocation between the public and
the private sectors.  It is therefore important to set up an appropriate linkage between the
NPS and occupational pensions.  In the short run, we may change the rules so that
contribution periods in different schemes over an individual’s work history be added up
to yield one’s total contribution period.  He/she may then receive pension benefits based
on his/her total contribution period.  In the long run, however, there will be a need for a
more comprehensive measure.  For example, occupational pensions may be changed to
have two-layered systems in line with the NPS.  Then the basic parts of all schemes may
be combined into one universal basic pension plan covering both the public and the
private sectors.  As for the earnings-related part, occupational pensions may be regarded
as “opt-out” schemes.
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2. Promoting Corporate Pensions and Linking them to the National Pension
A. Alternative Models
As part of the three-pillar income security system incorporating the state, corporations,
and individuals, corporate pensions should be actively promoted.  The current lump-
sum retirement allowance should be converted into corporate pensions and effectively
linked to the NPS.  There are three alternative ways to link corporate pensions to the
NPS.  First, corporate pensions may be introduced independently from the NPS and tax
favors provided to corporate pensions.  This may be called a mutually independent
model.  An example can be found in the US.  Second, a ‘contracting out’ or ‘opting out’
from the earnings-related part of the NPS may be allowed for qualified corporate
pensions.  This may be called a partial replacement model, as can be found in the UK
and Japan.  Last, public pensions may be totally privatized as with the complete
replacement model, which has been adopted by Chile, Argentina and other Latin
American countries.
1) Independent Corporate Pensions
Independent corporate pensions have no direct linkage to public pensions.  In this case,
tax favors are given to those qualified corporate pension plans if they satisfy a given set
of conditions.  The qualification conditions may include the external management of
funds, benefits over a certain minimum level, financial stability, and the guarantee for
payment.  The tax favors may be given at various stages.  At the contribution stage, the
entire contribution by employers as well as a part of the contribution by employees may
be exempted from taxation.  At the investment stage, the investment returns on pension
assets may also be exempted from taxation.  On the other hand, pension benefits may be
taxed at the payment stage.  But the tax should not be greater than the current tax on the
retirement allowance.
Introducing independent corporate pensions is the easiest way to convert existing lump-
sum payment schemes into corporate pensions.  But it also has weaknesses.  First, the
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already high rates of income replacement may rise to an even higher level with the
introduction of independent corporate pensions.  The contribution rates of employers
may also rise.  The current combined contribution rate of employers starts at 12.8
percent (4.5 percent for the NPS and 8.3 percent for the mandatory retirement allowance
scheme) and is expected to rise up to around 20 percent in the future.  Additional burden
due to corporate pensions is clearly undesirable.
Second, tax favors may not be enough to induce employers to convert existing
retirement allowance schemes into corporate pensions.  Very few employers save the
entire amount of reserves for retirement allowances outside their own companies.8  In
fact, the reserves are often used as working capital, and even when the reserves are
saved outside the company, they are usually used as collateral for loans.  With the
introduction of corporate pensions, it is impossible to continue these practices.  Tax
favors, however large they may be, would not make up for the loss of working capital or
collateral in most cases.
2) Opt-out
In the partial replacement model, firms with qualified corporate pension plans are
allowed to opt out from the earnings-related part of the NPS.  In the case of defined
benefit plans, qualified corporate pensions refer to those plans that provide similar
benefits or require similar contributions to the earnings-related part of the NPS.  The
opt-out system has been adopted in some countries including Japan and the UK (see
Table 13).
                                                          
8
 According to a survey conducted in 1992, the average reserve for retirement allowances amounted to
only 88% of the accumulated amount of mandatory contributions.  And only 8% of these companies
saved the total reserves externally.
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Table 13. Opt-out Systems in Other Countries
Japan UK
Background
- In 1965, the Welfare Pension
Insurance Act was amended to
increase the benefit level (by 40%),
resulting in higher insurance
premium to be paid by both
employers and employees.
- In order to reduce the burden of
those firms which have corporate
pensions, the ‘Welfare Pension
Fund’ was introduced in 1986 and
these firms were allowed to opt out
from the earnings-related part of the
Old Age Welfare Pension.
- The opt-out system was introduced to
reduce the duplication of the State
Earnings-Related Pension Scheme
(SERPS) and the corporate pensions.
- In 1959, the opt-out was first allowed
to those defined benefit plans which
provided larger benefits than SERPS.
- By the amendment of Social Security
Act in 1986, it was expanded to the
defined contribution plans as well as to
personal pension plans.
Current
System
- Firms are exempted from the
contribution to the Old Age Welfare
Pension when their corporate
pensions satisfy the following
conditions:
. The corporate pension should be
established upon agreement
between the employer and the
employees and its benefit level
should surpass that of the Old Age
Welfare Pension;
. The firm concerned should have
500 or more employees.
. The pension asset should be
managed by a life insurance
company or a trust bank.
. The pension should be fully funded
and saved outside the firm.
- Opting out with private pension plans is
very popular in the UK.
. Private pensions cover 75% of
workers (corporate pensions 50%,
personal pensions 25%), and the
SERPS covers only 17%.
- To be qualified for opt-out, defined
benefit plans should provide larger
benefits than SERP, and defined
contribution plans should require larger
contributions than SERP.
- The contribution rates to SERP are
reduced for those with qualified plans.
. For corporate pensions, employers’
rates are reduced by 3% and
employees’ by 1.6%. For personal
pensions, employers’ rates are reduced
by 1.5% and employees’ by 1.6%.
* The contribution rates of SERPS
range between 2% and 10% for
employees and between 3% and 10%
for employers.
The opt-out system looks like a better choice than the independent corporate pension
scheme in many aspects.  The duplication of similar plans (the earnings-related part of
the NPS and the corporate pension) can be minimized, with lower replacement rates for
retirees and smaller burdens on employers.  Employers will also have a greater incentive
to introduce corporate pensions, since obligation to contribute to the earnings-related
part of the NPS will be negated.  The contribution to corporate pensions can be simply
diverted from the contribution to retirement allowance reserves.
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3) Privatization
The development of the private pension market can be promoted significantly by
privatizing the public pension schemes, as is the case in several Latin American
countries including Chile and Argentina.  In these countries, the whole responsibilities
for premium collection, asset management, and benefit payment were handed over from
the government to the private sector.  The government only concerns itself with
enforcing relevant legislation.  Privatized corporate pensions are similar to personal
pensions in that, in both cases, pension savings accounts (PSAs) are managed by
individuals.  The only difference lies in the legal enforcement of PSAs in the case of
privatized corporate pensions.
The privatization of public pensions began in Chile in 1981, followed by Peru (1993),
Columbia (1994), Argentina (1994), Uruguay (1996), Mexico (1997), and Bolivia
(1997).  Other countries, including the US, the UK, China, Australia, and New Zealand,
are also considering the privatization of public pension schemes.  In all countries,
privatized pensions are financially sustainable because they are run as a fully-funded,
defined contribution system. They also contribute to the development of financial
markets and to the growth of private savings.
Nonetheless, there are several constraints Korea faces in immediately privatizing public
pensions.  First, the instability of financial markets can limit the benefit of private
management of pension assets.  In an extreme case, a person can find upon retirement
that his/her PSA has no sizable assets due to the downturn of the market coupled with
his/her own mismanagement.  In theory, the government has no obligation to guarantee
pension benefits, but in reality it is never free from political responsibility for old-age
income security.  At present, it does not appear that the Korean financial market is
stable and transparent enough to support privatized pension schemes.
Second, by restoring the actuarial balance of the scheme, privatization will necessarily
entail benefit levels substantially lower than what is currently promised.  The political
resistance to such changes will not be easy to overcome.  Political resistance can also
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show up in dealing with the implicit pension debts currently accumulated in the NPS.
Without privatization, these debts are to be borne by contributors, while with
privatization, they should be borne by taxpayers.  The burden in the form of tax is much
more transparent than in the form of contribution.  Privatization will provoke debate on
how and on whom the burden should be imposed.
B. Proposals to Link Corporate Pensions to the National Pension
As mentioned above, the opt-out system may be the most suitable way to introduce
corporate pension schemes in Korea and also to link them to the existing national
pension.
Both in the UK and Japan, the opt-out systems have been introduced to contain benefits
and contributions at appropriate levels (Table 13).  The UK can provide a good
benchmark for Korea with its long history of corporate pension schemes and its
sophisticated institutional mechanism to protect pensioners’ rights.  Japan may also be
considered a good reference point as it has converted the retirement allowance scheme
into corporate pension schemes as is foreseen to take place in Korea.
One of the key issues in introducing the opt-out system is to what extent corporate
pensions should be allowed to substitute for the earnings-related part of the NPS.  The
appropriate degree of substitution depends on the particular situation facing each nation.
Here, the discussion will assume that the existing NPS will be maintained and that the
benefit level of corporate pensions to be introduced will be based on the current
contribution level of retirement allowances.
Before determining the degree of substitution, we should first determine the appropriate
level of old-age income.  Of course, there can be no objective and absolute criteria for
the level of income replacement.  Nevertheless, the required income for the elderly is
generally thought to be smaller than the required income for younger people.  This is
due to the lower tax burden, savings and expenses of the elderly.  In addition, public or
corporate pensions need not secure 100 percent of the required income since most
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people have personal pensions or other savings.
The appropriate post-retirement income is estimated to be 55-70 percent of pre-
retirement income (Schmitt, 1985).  But the actual replacement rate for those who have
worked at least 40 years is approximately 85 percent, incorporating 60 percent from the
NPS and 25 percent from retirement allowances.9  Hence, the income replacement rate
needs to be reduced by at least 15 percent.  Now if we cut the earnings-related pension
of the NPS in half, the replacement rate of the NPS declines from 60 percent (30 percent
from the earnings-related pension and 30 percent from the basic pension) to 45 percent
(15 percent from the earnings-related pension and 30 percent from the basic pension),
and the total replacement rate declines from 85 percent to 70 percent.  This replacement
rate level lies in the upper range of 55-70 percent and is appropriate as suggested above.
Therefore, if corporate pensions were to be introduced in place of retirement
allowances, it would be desirable to allow corporate pensions to substitute for half of
the earnings-relate part of the NPS.
Figure 1. Corporate Pensions’ Opt-out Case (40 years of contribution)
       Total income            Total income
   replacement  replacement
     rate: 85%  rate: 70%
  NPS
 
The contribution rates of the NPS should be reduced for those who opt out (partially)
from the earnings-related part of the NPS.  If the NPS were actuarially balanced at the
contribution rate of 9 percent, then we can simply reduce the rate by one fourth to 6.75
percent.  Unfortunately, the current NPS is suffering from a serious imbalance.
Restoring the balance requires the contribution rate to be raised gradually to around 20
                                                          
9
 These estimates were made under the assumption that mandatory retirement allowances are converted
into monthly contribution (8.3% of monthly wage) to the NPS.
Retirement
Allowances (25%)
Earnings-related
pension (30%)
Basic pension
(30%)
Corporate Pension
(25%)
Earnings-related
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(30%)
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percent.  Assuming that such an increase is possible and that the NPS will eventually
achieve actuarial balance, we suggest that the contribution rate for those who opt out
from the NPS be reduced by one fourth.
3. Private Management of the Pension Reserve Fund
The total volume of public pension funds including the National Pension reached 55
trillion won as of 2000.  The amount is to skyrocket in the near future; to around 500
trillion won in 2010, 1000 trillion in 2020, and 2000 trillion in 2040 (at 1995 constant
prices).  The success of public pension schemes will depend on the sound management
of this huge reserve, which will also contribute to the development of Korea’s financial
market as well as the stable growth of the national economy.
Currently, more than two-thirds of the NPS reserve is being used by the government for
various government programs.  The rest is managed by the National Pension
Corporation and is invested in bonds and stocks.  But unprofessional management
practices partly contributed to the spreading public distrust of the NPS itself.  The
current government monopoly in the management of NPS reserves will be neither
desirable nor possible in the future.  Administrative inefficiency caused by lack of
expertise and political meddling with the funds would do harm not only to the fund
itself but also to the financial market and the national economy.  The World Bank points
out that no country could successfully manage the pension fund under a government
monopoly (World Bank, 1994).
The best alternative would be the contracting-out system with decentralized
management of pension reserve by the private sector.  Such decentralized management
would stimulate competition between private management agencies and contribute to
the development of the financial market.
The government has recently acknowledged the need for external fund management and
embarked on a pilot project in 2000.10  The government commissioned four private
                                                          
10
 Ministry of Health and Welfare, Pilot Project for External Management of the National Pension
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agencies and entrusted them with 50 billion won each for a period of one year.  An
External Fund Manager Selection Committee was formed to guarantee the transparency
of the selection process, and the Committee then set a rule of diversification as well as
investment guidelines for the commissioned agencies.
This pilot project appears to be an important step toward a full-blown external
management of the NPS reserves.  For the success of the project, however, the amount
of reserves entrusted to private agencies should be substantially increased in the future.
In addition, the pension reserve should be separately managed from other assets in the
management agencies.  More importantly, any unnecessary interference in the asset
management by the government and the National Pension Corporation should be
minimized.  Their role should be confined to monitoring the external fund managers’
compliance with the rules, evaluating their investment performance, and collecting and
analyzing relevant information.
IV. Conclusion
Experts in academia have often criticized the structural weakness and financial
vulnerability of public pension schemes as well as the inefficient fund management.
Nevertheless, necessary reform measures were not implemented because various parties
with differing interests could not reach an agreement.  If these problems remain
unresolved, they will surely impose great economic and social burdens in the future.
This paper has examined the current state and problems of Korea’s public pension
schemes and also reviewed reform proposals.  The main points are summarized below.
First, the current NPS has three basic problems: financial instability stemming from the
imbalance between benefits and contributions; lack of coverage for the majority of poor
people; and difficulty of assessing the incomes of the self-employed.  To solve these
problems, a radical restructuring is called for.  The two-layered system proposed by the
National Pension Reform Board in 1997, but not accepted by the authorities, must be
given serious reconsideration.  The tax-based basic pension, the first layer of the
                                                                                                                                                                         
Reserve (Draft), 1999.12.
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proposed scheme, would solve the second and third problems indicated above.
Meanwhile, the fully funded earnings-related pension (the second layer) would improve
the financial viability of the NPS and solve the first problem.  In moving toward the
new scheme, the combined income replacement rate of the NPS and the retirement
allowance scheme should be adjusted downward as its current level is deemed too high.
Second, public occupational pension schemes, which are already on the verge of
financial crisis, must be restructured radically.  If not, these schemes will impose a huge
burden on government finances in the future.  To make both ends meet, simply
increasing the contribution rate would not be sufficient.  Rather, measures to lower the
benefit level, including the introduction of a minimum pensionable age and the
adjustment of the benefit formula, should be implemented.  Also, methods to link the
NPS and public occupational pension schemes to insure the portability of pension
entitlement should be searched for.
Lastly, as part of the multi-pillar income security system comprised of the state,
corporations, and individuals, corporate pension schemes should be actively promoted.
For this purpose, more incentives to convert the current retirement allowances into
corporate pensions should be provided.  At the same time, an effective linkage between
the NPS and corporate pensions should be set up to avoid the duplication of benefits and
reduce labor costs.  Allowing firms to opt out from the earnings-related part of the NPS
with their own pension plans may be useful in this regard, as experienced in the UK and
Japan.  While the combined income replacement rate can be kept at an appropriate level
in this opt-out system, firms will also have more incentives to convert current retirement
allowances into corporate pensions as their burden declines in the opt-out system.
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